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Abstract
Background: Many low-and middle-income countries (LMIC) of the World Health Organization (WHO) European
Region have introduced social health insurance payroll taxes after the political transition in the late 1980s, combined
with budget transfers to allow for exempting specific population groups from paying contributions, such as those
outside formal sector work and in particular vulnerable groups. This paper assesses the institutional design aspects of
such financing arrangements and their performance with respect to universal health coverage progress in LMIC of the
European region.
Methods: The study is based on a literature review and review of secondary databases for the performance
assessment.
Results: Such financing arrangements currently exist in 13 LMIC of that region, with strong commonalities in
institutional design: This includes a wide range of different eligible population groups, mostly mandatory
membership, integrated pools for both the exempted and contributors, and relatively comprehensive benefit
packages. Performance is more varied. Enrolment rates range from about 65 % to above 95 %, and access to
care and financial protection has improved in several countries. Yet, inequities between income quintiles persist.
Conclusions: Budget transfers to health insurance arrangements have helped to deepen UHC or maintain
achievements with respect to UHC in these European LMICs by covering those outside formal sector work, and in
particular vulnerable population groups. However, challenges remain: a comprehensive benefit package on paper is
not enough as long as supply side constraints and quality gaps as well as informal payments prevail. A key policy
question is how to reach those so far uncovered.
Keywords: Universal health coverage, Health insurance, Informal sector, Vulnerable populations, Government budget
transfers, Financial protection
Background
Many low-and middle-income countries (LMIC) of the
World Health Organization (WHO) European Region
have introduced payroll taxes and a social health insur-
ance (SHI) agency after the political transition in the late
1980s. Prior to this transition, these countries were char-
acterized by high levels of financial protection and
equity in access, as well as a broad population coverage.
Thus, there was a risk of moving away from universal
population coverage if they had merely shifted to or con-
tinued with “traditional” SHI that would focus on the
formal sector employees and their dependents only,
whereby entitlement is linked to paying contributions.
Instead, government revenues were the starting point for
health financing, and budget transfers were built into
the design of the introduction of earmarked payroll taxes
right from the start. Budget transfers primarily serve,
though not exclusively, to exempt specific population
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groups from payroll taxes as they are unable to pay in-
surance contributions by themselves due to no, very low
or unsteady income.
This option of using state budget revenues to explicitly
pay the contributions on behalf of specific groups that
do not contribute themselves, in addition to cross-
subsidization from contributions, is also known as gov-
ernment subsidization of insurance contributions or as
subsidized enrolment in health insurance in the litera-
ture, particularly in other regions [1–6]. More than 40
LMIC have chosen to progress towards universal health
coverage (UHC) through this health financing arrange-
ment. This is because they realise that progress towards
UHC is not possible only via earmarked payroll taxes
collected from the formal sector. Delinking entitlement
from directly paying contributions and using general tax
funding to maintain or expand coverage via a health in-
surance type mechanism, i.e. via a separate pooling and
purchasing agency, is particularly widespread in the
WHO European Region. While taking on this specific
focus on state budget transfers to health insurance type
schemes, this is not to say that this is the only viable
health financing mechanism and path to progress to-
wards and deepen UHC.
This paper specifically analyses these government rev-
enue transfer arrangements with a regional focus on the
low-and middle-income countries of the WHO European
Region (abbreviated as EURO) (see [7] for a list of all
countries in that region). Existing literature on this topic
and region includes single country studies on the health
(financing) system. Taking on a functional perspective,
Kutzin et al. [8, 9] provide a comprehensive and detailed
assessment of health financing reform implementation in
transition countries of that region. Building upon this
work, this paper focuses on the specific institutional de-
sign features of the contribution exemption arrangements
using budget transfers in EURO LMIC.
The overall aim of this paper is to provide a focused
and detailed overview of such arrangements and their
institutional design aspects and to explore their patterns,
commonalities and differences among these countries. It
also seeks to assess progress with respect to UHC on the
basis of which those critical institutional design features
that are particularly conducive for UHC progress are
identified. This serves to derive policy lessons of what
works and what does not. Furthermore, this paper
complements another paper by Vilcu/Mathauer (2016)
[10] of the same subject on high-income countries of
the WHO European Region. They are part of a series
of regional studies (Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa),
all with the same research focus on budget transfers/
subsidization arrangements [11, 12]. Last not least, even
though the term "scheme" or "financing arrangement" is
used, the unit of analysis is the whole system, since these
schemes aim to cover and are designed for the whole of
the population.
The focus of this paper is largely on population groups
outside formal sector employment. These include poor
people, agricultural and informal sector workers, as well
as other vulnerable groups. In general, vulnerable groups
can be defined as those individuals with an increased
susceptibility to not having adequate access to health
care and sufficient financial protection due to economic,
demographic, or geographic characteristics [13].
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
outlines the methods and the analytical framework ap-
plied. The third section assesses the institutional design
aspects of these financing arrangements as well as pro-
gress towards UHC. This is followed by a discussion of
possible effects of specific institutional design aspects on
and challenges related to progress towards UHC, while
the last section concludes with policy lessons.
Methods
This paper included those European LMIC having a (so-
cial) health insurance type arrangement that operates as a
separate purchasing agency with budget transfers serving
to maintain and deepen coverage of selected population
groups, in particular people outside formal sector work
and vulnerable groups. In an initial step, all EURO coun-
tries belonging to the group of low- and middle income,
based on the World Bank country classification of 2014
[14] were screened and included if the Global Health Ex-
penditure Database (GHED) [15] reported Social Health
Insurance expenditure (termed social security funds in
GHED). In a second step, the literature was screened via
PubMed and Google to identify all LMIC countries of that
region with both social health insurance expenditure and
government revenue transfers to exempt specific popula-
tion groups. For that matter, the name of each country
was combined with the following search terms: budget
transfer OR health subsidization OR health subsidy OR
health insurance OR health vulnerable. This two-step ex-
ploration rendered a list of 13 countries. While Latvia
does not belong to this list, notably, since 2013 it prepares
the introduction of a Compulsory Health Insurance sys-
tem by linking entitlement to health services to the pay-
ment of income tax [14]. Kazakhstan is not included here,
since the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund operated for
only two years [16].
Once the list of countries was established, in a next
step, a literature search was conducted for each country
over the period of 1980 to May 2015 in PubMed, Science
Direct, JSTOR and Google. Titles identified through the
search process were reviewed, and if found to be relevant
the abstract or executive summary was read. If this
suggested that the publication could provide information
on the institutional design or on its impact, the full
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publication was assessed. In Google, the first five pages,
with 10 results per page, were considered. The search gen-
erated several publications for each country. While this
allowed for triangulation, the study presents information
from the most recent publications.
The same search terms were used in this step: health
system OR health financing OR health insurance OR
health subsidy OR budget transfer OR exemption OR
health vulnerable OR health Roma. All key words were
used in combination with the respective country AND/
OR scheme name. The data search for information on
UHC related performance was based on the following
terms: impact health insurance OR catastrophic health
expenditure OR impoverish* health care OR out-of-
pocket payment OR financial protection OR access health
OR utilization health care OR health insurance coverage
OR universal coverage. Additionally, data for the perform-
ance assessment was collected from the WHO databases
“Health for All” and GHED, country household income
and expenditure survey reports, insurance statistics as well
as other country statistics and reports. Thus, the study is
based on a literature review and review of secondary data-
bases for the assessment of UHC progress.
The paper’s analytical framework to assess the institu-
tional design features of budget transfer arrangements
starts from the three health financing functions described
in Kutzin (2001) [17] and looks specifically at the follow-
ing features:
1. Revenue raising:
Eligibility and enrolment arrangements;
Financing arrangements;
2. Pooling arrangements;
3. Purchasing arrangements and benefit package
design.
On this basis, a more detailed framework was devel-
oped which is presented in Table 1 providing an over-
view of the institutional design aspects and how these
potentially relate to progress toward UHC. These aspects
and UHC progress indicators are explained in more de-
tail in the Additional file 1. It is important to note that
enrolment and coverage through exemption from contri-
butions in such schemes is only one possible and plaus-
ible factor among several to explain improvements in
the level of financial protection and access to care of
subsidized beneficiaries.
Results
Country and scheme overview
This paper includes 13 countries in the European region
with a health insurance type scheme plus government
revenue transfers, i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Montenegro,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Serbia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(TFYR Macedonia) and Turkey. This is a mix of both
lower- and upper-middle income countries, with
Kyrgyzstan having moved to the group of lower middle-
income countries only in 2013. The Russian Federation and
Lithuania, high-income countries since 2012 only, are also
included as a way to capture their reform experiences over
the past 15 years since introduction.
Bosnia & Herzegovina consists of two separate entities:
the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina and the separate
Republika Srpska, with both entities having their own
separate health insurance pool. Therefore, this study
covers in total 14 country health financing systems in 13
countries.
With the exception of Turkey, the countries assessed
here have a similar legacy with respect to financing their
health systems falling into two patterns. In Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova and the
Russian Federation, as part of the former Soviet Union,
health care was tax-funded from the government budget.
The same approach was taken by Albania, Bulgaria and
Romania [6]. All these countries, except the Republic of
Moldova, introduced payroll taxes and combined these
with government revenue transfers in the early or
mid-1990s as part of other major economic reforms.
The Republic of Moldova introduced both payroll taxes
and government revenue transfers later, in 2004. The
introduction of earmarked payroll taxes foremost served
to generate sufficient public revenues to increase cover-
age as to scope (i.e. the range of services) and depth
(proportion of costs covered). On the other hand, in
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and TFYR
Macedonia, which had belonged to the Socialist Republic
of Yugoslavia, state employees were covered by compul-
sory health insurance prior to the transition [18].
Thereafter, SHI coverage was expanded to the whole
population through the combination with state budget
transfers. Before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, these
countries were characterized by broad population cover-
age, high levels of financial protection and equity despite
problems like lack of financial resources, inefficiencies in
resource allocation and material shortages [19]. This
favourable “starting point” in terms of equity is a major
difference to LMIC in other regions [20].
In contrast, Turkey and Georgia pursued a different
path in that their financing arrangements for the
exempted groups were implemented independently from
the financial protection mechanisms for the rest of the
population. In Turkey, social security existed for formal
sector employees since the 1940s, whereas the “Green
Card Scheme” for uninsured low income people was in-
troduced in 1992 only. In 2012, this scheme was merged
with the formal sector SHI schemes. As to Georgia, the
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Table 1 Institutional design features of state budget transfer/government subsidization arrangements
Institutional design aspect Related policy choices Intermediate output indicators UHC related progress indicators
Eligibility and enrolment rules
Groups eligible for exemption from
contributions/subsidization
Definition of vulnerability (e.g. children, unemployed,
pregnant women, informal sector workers, poor,
near poor)
Share of the eligible among
the bottom two income quintiles
and other vulnerable groups
Total population coverage
(i.e. enrolment in health
insurance fund), differentiated
along income quintiles
Targeting method E.g. universal (based on a very broad criterion such
as residence or no employment in the formal sector),
indirect (based on socio-demographic, socio-economic
or geographic characteristics usually correlated with
poverty and vulnerability), direct (through a means
assessment or proxy means testing); different
targeting approaches can be in place at the same
time for different groups
Share of the exempted/subsidized
within total (insured) population;
Share of the exempted/subsidized
among those being targeted for
exemption/subsidization (targeting
effectiveness of the system)
Enrolment process Active enrolment by the beneficiary or automatic
enrolment by the authorities
Organization responsible for identification
of the exempted non-contributors/the
subsidized
E.g., insurance company; central, regional, local
government
Type of enrolment / membership Mandatory or voluntary
Financing arrangements
Degree of subsidization/co-contribution Full or partial (a co-contribution is required) Share of the exempted/subsidized
within total (insured) population/
those being targeted for
subsidization (importance of
government revenue)
Type of transfer mechanism Individual-based (a specific amount is being paid
for each exempted individual), or lump-sum (a lump
sum transfer for the entire exempted population is made)
Calculation logic to determine the amount
of funds to be transferred
E.g., based on regular contribution levels, minimum or
average wages, specific percentage of the government
budget, negotiated by the government
Sufficient funding for a comprehensive
benefit package
Level of cross-subsidization from
contributions
Financial protection (incidence
of catastrophica / impoverishing
health expenditure), also
differentiated along income
quintiles and other aspects;
Access to servicesSource of funding for state budget transfers E.g. general government revenues, earmarked
government revenues, transfers from other health
insurance funds or from contributors within the same
pool (cross-subsidization), donor funding
Pooling arrangements
Type of pool(s) (general) Single pool, or multiple pools Degree of fragmentation,




Financial protectionType of pool (exempted/subsidized) Exempted/subsidized integrated in the pool with














Table 1 Institutional design features of state budget transfer/government subsidization arrangements (Continued)
Type of health insurance affiliation/
membership of the contributors
Voluntary or mandatory
Purchasing arrangements and benefit
package design
Range of services covered by the
benefit package
E.g. comprehensive, inpatient focus, outpatient focus,
pharmaceuticals, dental care, indirect costs (e.g. transportation)




Degree of cost-sharing Cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., co-insurance, co-payment,
deductible) and rates
Provider payment mechanisms Type of provider payment and rates
Same or different rules around provider payment
Efficiency















government had created the “Medical Insurance Scheme
for the Poor” (MIP) in 2006 [21], however until early
2013 the large majority of the population either had to
pay for health care services out-of-pocket or could pur-
chase voluntary private insurance. In September 2012, a
comprehensive MIP-style benefit package for pensioners,
children under 5 years and students was introduced, and
in February 2013, the Georgian government set up a Uni-
versal Health Insurance Program. This Program targets
every citizen that did not yet have insurance coverage up
to that date, including vulnerable groups previously not
eligible in the MIP [22]. Current plans focus on integrat-
ing the total population into one fund. Evaluations and
analyses on these very recent developments in Georgia
and Turkey are scarce, such that this paper primarily fo-
cuses on discussing the MIP and the Green Card Scheme.
Eligibility, targeting and enrolment
Whereas the terms “health insurance subsidization” and
“the subsidized” is appropriate for other regions, the de-
velopments in EURO are better grasped by a different
terminology. Except for the former Yugoslavian coun-
tries, the majority of the population was covered prior to
the transition. Hence, the shift to payroll taxation of for-
mal sector employees and a contributory SHI system im-
plied that various population groups outside the formal
sector who did not or could not contribute, needed to
be exempted from contributions in order to remain enti-
tled. To capture this context, this paper rather talks of
the “exempt” (exempted from contributions) instead of
“the subsidized” (their contributions being subsidized). Ex-
emption based on state budget transfers needs to be dis-
tinguished from family insurance. This refers to non-
contributory coverage of family dependents, i.e. children
and non-working spouse, via the principal affiliate through
cross-subsidization among contributors, which is also in
place in a number of countries of this region.
Regarding eligibility and related enrolment rules,
strong commonalities prevail, with a few exceptions: In
eleven out of thirteen countries, membership is de jure
mandatory for the exempt. Only in the case of Georgia’s
MIP and Turkey is participation voluntary [21, 23].
Second, some form of targeting is applied in nearly all
countries in order to identify individuals eligible for ex-
emption. All countries, except the Russian Federation,
Turkey and Georgia employ indirect targeting based on
demographic and socio-economic characteristics (see
Table 2). The six population groups most frequently
exempted include the unemployed (ten countries), dis-
abled people (nine countries), recipients of social assist-
ance (nine countries), youths enrolled in secondary or
higher education (seven countries), pregnant women/
postpartum mothers (seven countries) and children
below a set age ranging from 15 to 18 years (eight
countries) or, as in the case of Montenegro, children
whose parents are not able to work. Some of these popu-
lation categories need to be registered prior to being able
to enrol, e.g. the unemployed, disabled, pensioners and
recipients of social assistance.
The Russian Federation does not use targeting. Eligibility
has been “universalist” from the beginning, i.e. the entire
population outside formal sector employment is exempt
from paying contributions.
Only two countries (Georgia’s MIP and Turkey) apply
direct targeting and use proxy-means testing, whereby
individuals have to apply to be screened for eligibility.
Yet, since September 2012, the Georgian government
has been undertaking efforts to broaden coverage. First, it
started to finance a benefit package comparable to that of
the MIP to additional groups, namely pensioners, children
under five years and students, by applying an indirect tar-
geting approach [21]. In a second step, in 2013, the non-
contributory Universal Health Care Program was intro-
duced, pursuing a universalist approach. The Program in-
tends to eventually cover the total population that is
not otherwise insured via voluntary or corporate in-
surance [22].
To summarize, in the majority of the countries entitled
individuals are identified by indirect targeting, based on
a broad range of socio-demographic and socio-economic
characteristics. Affiliation is most often mandatory.
Turkey is different in this regard by employing direct
targeting and making participation voluntary, which was
equally the case for the previous MIP in Georgia.
Financing arrangements
The SHI agencies have become the key pooling and pur-
chasing agencies for most countries studied here: SHI
expenditure is one form of general government revenues
for health (GGHE), and the shares of SHI as of GGHE
are above 70 % in nine countries in 2013. Three coun-
tries (Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Turkey) have shares above
60 %, while the Russian Federation is lower with 39 %
(see Table 3). Notably, the SHI expenditure, as reported
in current GHED data, includes the general government
transfers. However, the share of GGHE as of THE has
only increased in 6 countries, while it actually decreased
in 7 countries [15].
Currently available health account data does not pro-
vide information on the shares of different sources of
funds received by the pooling agency, but for the few
countries where data was found the amount of govern-
ment revenues being transferred is more than 50 %.
The main source for funding on behalf of the exempted
groups are general government revenues, most often from
the central government, with the exception of the Russian
Federation and Bosnia & Herzegovina, which use regional
government funds (see Table 3). Another important
Mathauer et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:57 Page 6 of 20
Table 2 Eligible groups for exemption from health insurance contributions
Country (World Bank income
classification, 2014)
Year of introduction of (social)
health insurance [7]
Year of introduction of government
revenue transfers [7]
Eligible groups Targeting method
Albania (UM) 1995 1995 children; women working at home; pregnant women;
disabled people; cancer patients; unemployed; recipients




1997 1997 disabled people; unemployed; refugees [61] indirect targeting [61]
Bosnia & Herzegovina
(UM) – Republika Srpska
1999 1999 children < 15 years; mature students while registered with
the Republic Bureau of Employment; pregnant women;
disabled people; registered unemployed with secondary
and higher education; redundant employees still receiving
compensation in accordance with the labour; recipients of
social assistance; refugees and displaced persons; elderly
> 65 years [34, 61]
indirect targeting [61]
Bulgaria (UM) 1998 1998 children < 18 years; youths < 26 years enrolled in full-time
education; pregnant women; postpartum mothers; disabled
people entitled to social support; parents or spouses taking
care of disabled people in constant need of help; unemployed
entitled to compensation; refugees; prisoners; spouses of
soldiers participating in international missions; injured while
performing their duties as employees of the Ministry of Interior
and civil servants; war veterans [38]
indirect targeting [38]
Georgia (MIP) (LM) 1995 (but abolished in 2004) 2006 (Medical Insurance for the Poor) poorest 20 % of Georgian householdstwo regions (Adjara and
Tbilisi) fund additional beneficiaries (the near-poor, or those
with slightly higher proxy means test scores) [21]
direct targeting:
proxy-means test [21]
Kyrgyzstan (LM) 1997 1997 eligible since 1997: registered unemployed; people with
disabilities since childhood; persons receiving social
benefitseligible since 2000: children < 16 years; enrolled
school children < 18 years; enrolled students of basic,
secondary, and higher full-time education < 21 yearseligible
since 2002: refugees [30, 62, 63]
indirect targeting [30]
Lithuania (H) 1997 1997 children < 18 years; students; women on maternity leave;
disabled and their carers; persons with certain illnesses;
people on long-term sickness benefits; registered unemployed;
recipients of pensions, recipients of social assistance and social
insurance cash benefits [64, 65]
indirect targeting [66]
Montenegro (UM) 1993 1993 children of parents not able to work; orphans; unemployed
entitled to unemployment benefits; recipients of social assistance;
refugees; prisoners; military invalids; civil invalids of war; persons
receiving veteran allowance if not otherwise insured [67, 68]
indirect targeting [68]
Republic of Moldova (LM) 2004 2004 children < 18 years; youths enrolled in full-time education; full-time
students in mandatory postgraduate training and doctoral candidates;
carers for severely disabled children (into adulthood); pregnant
women; postpartum mothers; mothers with four or more children;
registered disabled; registered unemployed (for a max. of six months);















Table 2 Eligible groups for exemption from health insurance contributions (Continued)
Social Aid and families living below the poverty line [39] partial
exemption for self-employed (50–75 %) [26, 49]
Romania (UM) 1999 1999 children < 18 years; youths < 26 years if students with no income;
pregnant women; postpartum mothers; women on maternity leave;
parents on leave for taking care of children < 2 years (or < 3 years if
disabled); disabled; people on long-term sickness benefits; people
with no income and having certain illnesses; unemployed; recipients
of social assistance; prisoners; persons persecuted by the communist
regime or declared war heroes in the 1989 Revolution; war veterans;
retired persons with < 340 US$ income/month [24, 69]
indirect targeting [24]
Russian Federation (H) 1993 1993 non-working population with citizenship/ legal residence [27] universal [27]
Serbia (UM) 1992 1992 children < 15 years; children/youth < 26 years if enrolled in education;
pregnant women; postpartum mothers; disabled; registered
unemployed; recipients of social assistance; beneficiaries of
accommodation at institutions for social care; internally-displaced
people; refugees; Roma population who due to the traditional way
of life do not have a permanent living address; family members
whose bread giver is engaged on regular military service; elderly
> 65 years [70–72]
indirect targeting [72]
TFYR Macedonia (UM) 1991 1991 disabled; unemployed registered by the Employment Office;
beneficiaries of basic social care; prisoners; war-disabled persons; [73]
indirect targeting [73]
Turkey (Green Card Scheme) (UM) 1950–1971 1992 (Green Card Scheme) Turkish citizens living in Turkey who are not covered by any social
security scheme and who have a per capita household income of
< 1/3 of the minimum wage threshold (except for taxes and social
security premiums);pensioners > 65 years and people with chronic
illnesses are eligible even if their household’s per capita income is
> 1/3 of the minimum wage [23]
direct targeting:
proxy-means test [23]
a At this time Montenegro was still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
LM Low middle income category, UM Upper middle income category, L Low income category, H High income category














Table 3 Financing arrangements
Country Type of transfer logic Calculation logic to determine state budget transfer
amounts
Financing source of government revenue transfers Social Security Funds as %
of GGHE (2013) [15]
Albania lump-sum [31, 44] base for calculating government transfer is per capita
health care expenditure during the previous year [41]








Republika Srpska: contributions from the
entity budget may not be less than the average per
person contribution from the previous year [61]
unemployed entitled to benefits: Unemployment Fund
all other exempted: entity budget [61]
97.5
Bulgaria per capita [38] unemployed entitled to benefits: 8 % of the
unemployment benefit (needs to be between the
minimum and maximum income basis for insurance
contributions), others: 8 % of a predefined minimum
income basis for insurance contributions [38]
unemployed entitled to benefits: Unemployment Fund
all other exempted: central government budget [38]
76.4
Georgia (MIP) per capita [21] contribution is determined through a tender process
where insurance companies propose a contribution at
which they would provide insurance covering a
predefined benefit package; the insurance company
with the lowest offer is selected [21]
central government budget two regions fund additional
beneficiaries out of their regional government budgets [21]
68.8
Kyrgyzstan per capita [63] base for calculation is 1.5 times the minimum wage [63] central government budget [63]; share of government
transfers as of SHI revenues: 78 % (includes funding for the
state guaranteed benefit package for all) [48]
64.1
Lithuania per capita [75] up to 36 % of the average gross monthly wage lagged
by 2 years [76]
Counter-cyclical measures of compulsory
health insurance contributions made by the state on
behalf of the unemployed and economically inactive people
central government budget [77]; share of government
transfers as of SHI revenues: 48 % (calculated by the
authors based on data from [76]
85.1
Montenegro per capita [68] unemployed entitled to benefits: 7.5 % of the
unemployment benefit
others: determined by law [61, 68]
unemployed entitled to benefits: unemployment fund: all
other exempted: central government budget [61, 67]
89.3
Republic of Moldova lump-sum [26] at least 12.1 % of the total government budget (annually) [26] central government budget [26]
share of government transfers as of total SHI budget:
55 % [78]
85.0
Romania women on maternity






woman on maternity leave, women on leave to take care
of children < 2 years (<3 years if disabled), prisoners: 6.5 %
of the sum representing the value of two national
minimum gross wages
people on sick leave, unemployed, recipients of social
assistance: 6.5 % of the sick leave, unemployment benefit
or social assistance [24]
others: n/a
women on maternity leave, prisoners, persons in military
service: central government budget; people on sick leave:
social security budget; unemployed: unemployment fund;
recipients of social assistance: local government budget [24]
all other exempted: n/a
83.0
Russian Federation lump- sum [27] per-capita amount of transfers is not specified; decided
by the government (budget contributions not enough to
cover the costs of the exempted population considering
that utilization is also much higher compared to the
contributors) [19]














Table 3 Financing arrangements (Continued)
Serbia per capita [61] 15.9 % of the average wage (the government not always
gives adequate funding for the exempted) [61]
disabled people: Pension and Disability Fund;
all other exempted: central government budget [61, 72]
93.6
TFYR Macedonia per capita [79] unemployed entitled to benefits: 10 % of the benefit
recipients of social assistance, prisoners, war invalids,
families of fallen soldiers: 10 % of half the average wage
all other exempted: 5.4 % of half the average wage [79]
the unemployed: unemployment fund


















financing source are social security or social assistance
funds, e.g. the unemployed fund for the unemployed or
the disability fund for the disabled, whereas in Romania,
funds to cover the eligible group of social assistance bene-
ficiaries come from local government revenues [24].
The regional funding as a source for government rev-
enue transfers together with its fragmented nature in
funding can be considered as a main reason for the diffi-
culties of the Russian SHI scheme to take-off, more so
as it was launched in a period of deep economic crisis.
The number of individuals meant to be exempted from
payment of health insurance contributions greatly
exceeded the funding capacity of the regional budgets,
themselves experiencing a massive shrinking of their fiscal
space [25]. This triggered either a lowering of regional/
local budget funding to providers or arrears of payment to
the mandatory health insurance system on behalf of the
exempted population, ultimately leading to high enrol-
ment rates, but with poor benefits. This is still observable
today. The initial difficulties in SHI implementation con-
tributed to its weakening, and the objective that general
government health expenditure should predominantly be
channeled through the SHI was not achieved to date.
Notably, in all countries, eligible population groups are
fully exempted. Full exemption is also motivated by the
concern that even small contributions might represent a
financial burden for these selected groups preventing
them from enrolling.
However, there is variation with respect to the type of
budget transfers on behalf of the exempt (see Table 3).
These are provided in form of a lump-sum in Albania,
the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and
Turkey. In contrast, a per-capita transfer logic applies in
all other countries (in Georgia's MIP until 2014), i.e. a
flat amount on behalf of each exempted member is
transferred. In Romania, transfers are also per capita,
but different amounts are paid for different groups.
Different approaches and formulas to determine the
lump sum or per capita transfers are used:
1) For those groups that also receive social security
benefits (e.g., the unemployed, social assistance
recipients, etc.), the social security institutions pay a
percentage of the respective benefit as a “contribution”
to the health insurance fund. This is the case in
Bulgaria, TFYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and
the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Contribution
rates are the same as those of contributing members
and range from 1 to 10 % of social security/social
assistance benefits. These are not state budget transfers
in the narrow sense, but part of general government
revenue.
2) The calculation of the government’s contribution for
the exempted can be based on the minimum wage,
as in Kyrgyzstan and Romania, on the average wage,
such as in TFYR Macedonia and Serbia, or the
average contribution amount of the previous year,
such as in the Republic Srpska. Alternatively, an
amount is determined in Bulgaria.
3) A specific share of the government budget is
allocated to the insurance fund(s) on behalf of the
exempted population, such as in the Republic of
Moldova, where the target share of allocations from
the annual government budget aims to be at least at
12 % [26].
4) The contribution level is not specified and is instead
set on the basis of a negotiation process by the
government. This is the case in Montenegro (for
those groups not receiving social security benefits)
and the Russian Federation. This procedure causes
difficulties to cover the costs of the exempted
population since the amount transferred to the
health insurance fund is not necessarily linked to the
actual expenditure [19, 27].
5) For Georgia’s MIP, the contribution was determined
through a tender process. Private insurance
companies proposed a contribution rate for which
they were willing to offer a predefined benefit
package for individuals eligible for the MIP. The
insurance with the lowest offer was then selected to
provide the MIP package to beneficiaries [21].
6) In Albania, the base for calculating the government
transfer is the per capita health care expenditure
during the previous year.
To summarize, eligible population groups are fully
exempted from making contributions in all countries.
The source of state budget transfers are primarily central
government revenues or to a lesser extent social security
funds. In most of the countries the transferred amount
is based on a defined calculation formula and per capita.
Pooling arrangements
One of the most notable commonality in institutional de-
sign is that all countries operate an integrated pool cover-
ing both the exempted and contributors right from the
beginning when the health insurance agency was estab-
lished, with Turkey and Georgia also having merged their
schemes into a single pool in 2012 and 2013 respectively.
Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Russian Federation are
the only two countries with multiple funds along terri-
torial lines, whereby the exempted population is inte-
grated into and part of the same territorial fund as the
rest of the contributing members. A risk equalization
mechanism is in place in the Russian Federation and
since 2002 in the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina
[28], with the aim of enhancing equity in the redistribu-
tive capacity across territorial funds. In Russia, however,
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in combination with a lack of clarity of the equalization
rules, the available funding at the federal fund level
proved to be insufficient to compensate for differences
in regional revenues from contributions and regional
budget transfers for the exempt [29]. Later on, federal
and to a lesser extent regional budgets outside the health
insurance system were used for the purpose of risk
equalization [27].
To sum up, in all countries, the exempted are mean-
while part of the same fund as the formal sector em-
ployees, and government revenue transfers are pooled
together with the contributions of formal sector em-
ployees. This takes place within a single payer system,
except in two countries.
Purchasing
Provider payment mechanisms
Since the exempted population groups are part of the
same scheme as the contributing members, except for
Georgia and Turkey in the past, health services provided
to the exempted are being remunerated through the
same provider payment mechanisms and rates as those
for the contributors. Providers are thus not confronted
with two different sets of incentives for those two groups.
More so, in Kyrgyzstan, providers receive a higher
remuneration rates for those beneficiaries exempted
from co-payments [30]. In contrast, in Georgia prior
to 2013, the private health insurance schemes had
differentiated provider payment rates for the MIP
beneficiaries compared to the other categories of insured.
Scope of services covered by the benefit package
Overall, the range of services covered by the benefit
packages is quite comprehensive in these countries, in-
cluding – at least de jure – primary care, specialised out-
patient care and inpatient services (see Additional file 2).
However, there is still variation between countries re-
garding the precise setup of the benefit packages. In all
countries, except Albania, Kyrgyzstan and the Republic
of Moldova, the insurance schemes purchase the bulk of
health care services. Apart from primary care, specialised
outpatient care and inpatient services, the packages also
include at least a limited range of preventive and emer-
gency dental services (except in Georgia). The schemes
in the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, TFYR
Macedonia and Montenegro also reimburse travel ex-
penses related to seeking health care. Moreover, pharma-
ceuticals from the country’s list of essential medicines or
a positive drug list are covered. Medicines coverage is
more limited in the Russian Federation, and outpatient
drugs are only reimbursed for specific population
groups [27]. Importantly, in Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Lithuania, TFYR Macedonia, Romania, the
Russian Federation and Turkey, emergency care and some
key services are provided by the Ministry of Health (e.g.
treatment of communicable diseases with outbreak poten-
tial, family planning) and can be accessed by everyone, re-
gardless of insurance status.
A different approach has been chosen by Kyrgyzstan,
where the government finances a so-called state-
guaranteed benefit package for the entire population,
whereas contributions and state budget transfers for the
exempt are used to finance additional services for those
enrolled [30]. The health insurance fund also operates as
the purchaser of the state-guaranteed package [9].
However, in contrast to the legal provisions, the actual
benefit package is in many countries de facto often less
comprehensive due to lack of financial resources, health
care facilities, qualified health care personnel, as well as
supply side shortages [32]. Comparing the benefit pack-
age of the contributors with that of the exempted reveals
that the benefit packages are identical in seven countries
(Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania,
Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey (see Additional file 3).
In five countries (Albania, TFYR Macedonia, Republic of
Moldova, Serbia and the Russian Federation), specific
groups of the exempted, namely children and pregnant
women, are covered by an even more comprehensive
package. For example, additional dental care or outpatient
medicines are included. Notably, in none of the countries
is the benefit package for exempt smaller than the benefit
package for the contributors.
Cost-sharing mechanisms
Cost-sharing for health care services and pharmaceuti-
cals is common across the region. Many countries of the
former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia introduced
cost-sharing mechanisms during the transition period in
the early 1990s in order to raise additional revenues for
the health sector [33]. Today, the Russian Federation is
the only country without any formal cost-sharing for the
benefit package other than for outpatient medicines in
this region [27]. Elsewhere, a range of different cost-
sharing mechanisms are applied, such as user charges per
service or co-insurance, as well as cost-sharing ceilings and
benefit ceilings for defined services (see Additional file 3).
Co-insurance rates, for example, range from 10–50 %
depending on the service and the population group.
A comparison of cost-sharing rates between the con-
tributors and the exempted reveals that these two
groups fall in principle under the same cost-sharing
rules (see Additional file 3). Yet, in the majority of the
countries, namely Albania, the Federation of Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, TFYR
Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Romania and Serbia,
certain groups among the exempt benefit from full
or partial cost-sharing exemptions. Groups exempted
from cost-sharing include children, pregnant women,
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chronically sick or disabled people, the unemployed and
social assistance beneficiaries. However, nowhere are all
population groups exempted from contributions fully ex-
empt from cost-sharing. Specifically, in the Federation of
Bosnia & Herzegovina the degree of cost-sharing is
adapted to the social status and the income situation of
an individual [34]. The same holds for Kyrgyzstan where
the amount of co-payments varies depending on the
region, disease profile, social status and existence of a
referral [30]. Turkey was the only one where exempted
individuals had to make co-payments for certain services
that are fully covered for regular contributing members,
namely dental care, prosthetics, and orthotics [23].
The real question, though, is whether the cost-sharing
exemption policies are put in practice. Evidence from
Romania, for example, suggests that they are not effective
in protecting the poor groups from financial hardship, as
three out of four poor patients do pay for health care [35].
Apart from formal cost-sharing payments, informal
payments in the health sector have been reported in all
the countries assessed here. Since informal payments are
unpredictable, they might especially represent a high
burden for poorer patients. Informal payments do not
necessarily take the form of cash, but may be provided
as presents, food or medical supplies taken to the health
care facility [24]. “Under the table” payments emerged in
the late 1980s in the former communist countries and as
a heritage of the past, they are still common today. In
most countries they significantly departed from their ori-
ginal “gratitude” dimension and reached a level of so-
phistication which make them an institutionalized
substitute to a formal co-payment/fee system. This is
certainly the case for the Russian Federation where there
are no formal co-payments [27].
In summary, most countries offer a relatively compre-
hensive benefit package, which is identical for the con-
tributing as well as for the subsidized members and
sometimes even more comprehensive for the latter.
Cost-sharing is widespread, but there are exemptions for
specific groups among the exempted.
Assessment of UHC related performance indicators
Population coverage
The share of the total population with (social) health
insurance coverage varies widely across countries, as
Table 4 shows. Statutory entitlement was lowest in
Georgia prior to the reforms (41 % of the population
covered by MIP in 2012) [36], and voluntary health in-
surance for the non-poor [21]. However, total population
coverage has increased extremely rapidly within a year
to 91 % in 2014 since the introduction of the Universal
Health Care Program in early 2013 [36].
The enrolment rate is also low for Albania (less than
50 %) [37]. On the other hand, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, TFYR Macedonia and the Republic
of Moldova have higher enrolment rates between 65 and
Table 4 Population coverage
Country (Social) health insurance coverage of total
population
Exempted as share of
insured population eligible population
Albania less than 50 % (according to household
surveys, no year indicated) [37]
n/a n/a
Bosnia & Herzegovina
a) Federation; b) Republika Srpska
65 %–83 % (2007) (depending on the part
of the country) [80]
50 % (2007) [61] a) 82 %; b) 70 % (2007) [81]
Bulgaria 77 % (2011) [38] 35 %a [38] n/a
Georgia MIP: 50 % (2012) [21]; Universal Health Care
Program: 91 % (2014) [36]
72 % (2010) [53] 73 % (2011) [21]
Kyrgyzstan 78 % (2009) [30]; 85 % of women and 90 %
of men (2012) [82]
n/a n/a
Lithuania 96 % (2008) [83] 58 % (including pensioners)a [83] n/a
Montenegro 96 % (2008) [84] unemployed: 25 % (2008)
refugees: 3 % (2008) [67]
n/a
Republic of Moldova 72 % (2008); 78 % (2010); 80 % (2011) [39, 49] 65 % (2011) [49] n/a
Romania 90 % (urban: 95 %; rural: 85 %) (2008) [69] 66 % (including persons in military
service)a [43]
n/a
Russian Federation 97 % (2009); 98 % (2010) [27] n/a 95 % (year not indicated) [27]
Serbia 93 % (2009) [85] registered unemployed: 2 % (2009)
all other exempted groups: 18 %
(2009) [86]
n/a
TFYR Macedonia 85 % (2012) [79] 29 % (2012) [79] n/a
Turkey (Green Card Scheme) 95 % (2012) [23] 14 % (2011)a [87] 64 % (2007) [87, 88]
a Calculations by authors based on data from the indicated sources.
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85 %. The highest share of insured persons with rates
between 90 % and nearly 100 % are found in Lithuania,
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey and the Russian
Federation, the latter applying a universalist approach
and having the highest enrolment rate of 98 % [38].
Differentiated data on enrolment rates across income
quintiles is only available for a few countries and reveals
that in Albania and the Republic of Moldova, the poorest
part of the population is much less likely to be covered,
pointing to inequitable coverage [18, 26, 39]. In contrast,
enrolment rates are equal across income quintiles only in
Serbia, the much higher total population coverage rate in
Serbia also being an explanatory factor [40].
It is equally important to explore the targeting effect-
iveness of the system, which is the ratio of exempted in-
dividuals as of potentially eligible beneficiaries. Although
differentiated data is scarce, of those countries with
available data, the Russian Federation has the highest
percentage of potentially eligible beneficiaries being
covered, namely 95 %. In Bosnia & Herzegovina and
the Republic of Srpska, this is 82 and 70 % respectively
(with most recent data available for 2007). In Georgia, this
share reached 73 % (data of 2011).
Another population coverage indicator is the share of
the exempted individuals as of the total insured popu-
lation, which gives an idea about the importance of
the exemption arrangement (see Table 4). The great-
est shares can be found in Georgia (72 %), Romania
(66 %), the Republic of Moldova (65 %) and Lithuania
(58 %). In Bosnia & Herzegovina, it is approximately
50 %. The shares in Bulgaria, TFYR Macedonia,
Turkey and Serbia are below 35 %.
A final question is whether these financing arrange-
ments succeed to cover all population groups, or
whether they fail to cover specific and vulnerable groups.
In fact, lack of coverage is a widespread problem among
the Roma population in Bosnia & Herzegovina [41],
Bulgaria [42], Republic of Moldova [26], Romania [43]
and Serbia [40]. The eligibility criteria for exemption are
one reason why Roma are less likely to be insured. In
themajority of the countries, identity documents, birth
certificates or residence permits are required for the en-
rolment in health insurance schemes. Yet members of
the Roma community often do not have such documents
[44]. Because of lack of identity documentation and
other barriers, a large percentage of the Roma popula-
tion is not insured. Serbia is the only country which
takes this into consideration by explicitly mentioning the
“Roma population who due to the traditional way of life
do not have permanent living address” as a group eligible
for exemption [45], and notably 81 % of the Roma are cov-
ered, possibly due to their different enrolment conditions.
Although the Roma account only for a small percentage
of a country’s total population, the low enrolment
rates among them are especially worrisome since they
face a higher risk of illness due to their living condi-
tions [24].
Lack of residency and/or identification documents is
also a major barrier to cover homeless people or internal
migrants in the Russian Federation or TFYR Macedonia
[27, 46]. But other groups may also encounter difficulties
to benefit from exemption of contributions, such as
people in need of social benefits but not entitled to it in
Bulgaria [47]. This is because being a beneficiary of so-
cial security benefits is often a requirement to be eligible
for exemption. For example, in the Republic Moldova
unemployment benefits are only granted for six month.
Thereafter, the individual also loses health insurance
coverage [26]. Such regulations limit coverage in a con-
text of lack of formal employment opportunities.
Likewise, the self-employed and specifically self-
employed agricultural workers (farmers) are reported to
lack health insurance coverage. In the majority of the
countries they have to pay SHI contributions, although
at lower rates [48]. At varying incomes, the set contribu-
tion rate may turn out to be unaffordable for them such
as in Albania [37] or Republic of Moldova [49, 50]. This
has implications on enrolment. For example, in the Re-
public of Moldova, health insurance coverage is compul-
sory for all citizens with the self-employed having to
purchase the policy for themselves. Yet, the penalties for
not having insurance coverage have not been fully
enforced, making the decision to purchase health insur-
ance in effect a voluntary one [49]. As a consequence, self-
employed agricultural workers in the Republic of Moldova
are 27 times more likely not to have health insurance
compared to formally employed individuals [50]. A survey
found that they considered it as too expensive [49]. Low
income self-employed farmers are one of the groups
where insurance coverage remains challenging [51].
In summary, overall enrolment is relatively high in this
region (mostly above 70 %). The exempted make up a
large share of the total insured population. The schemes
reach at least 70 % of the targeted population. However,
even with such arrangements in place, inequalities in in-
surance coverage between income quintiles persist, and
some population groups fall out of the insurance system
entirely.
Financial protection
In order to analyse the impact of exemption from contri-
butions on financial protection, disaggregated data for the
exempted population is needed. However, in the case of
integrated schemes, data is usually collected for the in-
sured population as a whole and no distinction is made
between the exempted and contributing individuals.
Out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure as a share of total
health expenditure (THE) greatly varies among the
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studied countries, ranging from 15 % in Turkey up to
62 % in Georgia in the year 2013 (Table 5). Looking over
time, in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, TFYR Macedonia and Turkey, OOP as a share
of THE decreased. In contrast, in Bulgaria, Lithuania,
Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation
and Serbia, OOP as a share of THE increased, which may
also be due to increased utilization rates.





OOP as % of
THE (2013) [15]
Change of OOP as % of
THE since the introduction
of government revenue
transfers [15]
OOP as a share of household expenditure
by income quintile (or otherwise indicated)
Utilization of health care services







29 % 27 % decrease since
introduction in
Republika Srpska
2004: 1st quintile: 2.3 % - 5th quintile: 1.2 % [18] n/a
Bulgaria (1998) 40 % 10 % increase the proportionally highest burden of OOPS




62 % 10 % decrease MIP beneficiaries pay approx. 40–60 % less
than non- beneficiaries for outpatient care
in the two regions Adjara and Tbilisi and
for inpatient care in all regions (2009) [21]
MIP has no impact on utilization




36 % 11 % decrease 2003: 1st quintile: 7.1 % - 5th quintile: 4.5 %
2009: 1st quintile: 4.4 % - 5th quintile: 4.0 % [30]
utilization of primary care among
the poorest quintile increased
slightly from 6.3 % in 2001 to
8.1 % in 2009 [30]
Lithuania (1997) 33 % 9 % increase n/a n/a
Montenegro
(1993)
43 % 13 % increase
(since 1995)a
2004: 1st quintile: 0.8 % - 5th quintile: 1.1 % [18] n/a
Republic of
Moldova (2004)
45 % 5 % increase 2008: 1st quintile: 2.8 % - 5th quintile: 7.8 %
2009: 1st quintile: 4.1 % - 5th quintile: 11.4 %
2010: 1st quintile: 3.6 % - 5th quintile: 7.4 % [49]
The uninsured are 3.8 times more like to
have had OOP for outpatient care
compared to the insured (in 2012); but
nearly 0.5 times for inpatient care [39])
11.2 % of the poorest quintile has
consulted a doctor in the past
four months compared to 25.5 %
of respondents from the richest
quintile (2010)
Share of exempt population
seeking health care in the last 4
weeks: 35.5 % (2008) and 41.7 %
(2010) [49]




48 % 31 % increase
(since 1995)a
n/a People of higher income quintiles
consume medical services more
frequently than those of lower
quintiles, although the latter’s
health outcomes are worse (no year
indicated) [27]
Serbia (1992) 38 % 12 % increase
(since 1995)a
2003: 1st quintile: 4.4 % - 5th quintile: 3.6 % [18] n/a
TFYR Macedonia
(1991)






15 % 15 % decrease
(since 1995)a
Green Card holders: estimated at 4.1 % (2003),
3.5 % (2006), 4.1 % (2009) [90]
OOPs as a share of household consumption
expenditure increased for low income
groups, but decreased for higher income
levels over 2003 to 2006 [91]
Green Card Program associated
with a positive and significant
impact on protecting health care
utilization of the poor during the
outbreak of the financial crisis.
22.4 % of the Green Card holders
reported forgone use of healthcare
services during the last 12 months
because of financial barriers,
compared to 6.1 % of rest of public
insurees [56, 88, 90]
a Introduction of the scheme occurred prior to 1995. National Health Accounts data is available from 1995 onwards
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In order to analyse the impact of contribution exemp-
tion on financial protection, disaggregated data for the
exempted population is needed. However, in the case of
integrated schemes, data is usually collected for the in-
sured population as a whole with no distinction made
between the exempted and contributing individuals. For
that matter, data disaggregated along income quintiles is
assessed instead.
Inequalities in OOP as a share of household expenditure
between different income quintiles continue to persist,
with lower income quintiles having a higher share in most
countries, although the gap reduced in Kyrgyzstan. In
contrast, in the Republic of Moldova and Montenegro,
higher income quintiles have a higher share of OOPs.
[30]. Likewise, in Georgia, average OOP payments for in-
patient care by the exempted are about 40–60 % of the
non-beneficiaries’ OOP expenditure. For outpatient care,
OOP for the exempted reduced in those two Georgian re-
gions that cover additional beneficiaries [52].
Data on the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is
only available for a few countries (see Additional file 4),
with only Georgia and Turkey having disaggregated data
for the exempted population. In Turkey, the incidence of
catastrophic expenditure for Green Card holders de-
creased slightly between 2003 and 2009. A much higher
share of exempted households experienced catastrophic
expenditures in Georgia, i.e.: 22.4 % in 2010. It was also
found that (between 2008 and 2010) only 14 % of MIP
beneficiaries made use of their insurance coverage dur-
ing a period when household income decreased and
OOP for non-covered pharmaceutical increased due to
various exogenous factors. Thus, it has been argued that
MIP was only able to cushion the negative impact on
the poorest without actually reducing the share of
households’ experiencing catastrophic expenditure [53].
The incidence of catastrophic spending reduced for
the poorest income quintile in the case of Albania and
the Republic of Moldova in recent years. For the latter
case, this can be partially explained by the expansion of
insurance coverage to the poorest households [49].
Moreover, in Albania, the incidence of impoverishing ex-
penditure also decreased from 6.5 % (2002) to 3.6 % (in
2008) [54]. In contrast, in Serbia, 2007 data reveals that
about 6 % of households were impoverished through
OOP [18, 55].
In summary, inequalities in OOP expenditure persist
despite the existence of government revenue transfers or
because coverage rates among the poorest income quin-
tiles are low, with medicines often being a main driver
for OOP, such as in the Republic of Moldova [39]. More-
over, despite insurance coverage, people belonging to the
bottom income quintile were still the most affected by
catastrophic expenditure compared to households at the
highest end of the income distribution, as found in
Albania, Georgia and Serbia. Altogether, evidence is
mixed regarding improvements in financial protection.
Access to and utilization of health care services
Data to reveal changes in utilization rates for the exempt
is limited. Utilization rates increased for the exempt in
Kyrgyzstan and the Republic of Moldova during specific
periods, and in the latter case are even higher than for
contributors [30, 49]. Yet, there was no improvement for
MIP beneficiaries in Georgia [52], and likewise in Turkey
[56], the exempt have lower rates than the rest of the in-
sured. Moreover, lower income quintiles have lower
utilization rates than higher income quintiles. In sum-
mary, it appears that the gap in the utilization rate be-
tween richer and poorer income quintiles decreases and
rates also have increased for the exempt in some coun-
tries, but inequities continue to exist.
Discussion
This section aims to explore the contribution and the
plausible effects of critical institutional design features of
such financing arrangements on progress towards UHC.
Importantly, there are many other factors, relating to the
supply side, service perception, and other developments
in the health sector and beyond, which affect and ex-
plain UHC progress.
The type of targeting method chosen
The way eligibility of exempted individuals is defined as
well as the targeting method of the exemption arrange-
ments appear to strongly influence enrolment. The data,
though scarce, does suggest that enrolment rates are
highest with a universalist approach, followed by an in-
direct targeting approach. The share of the exempted
among all insured is larger where indirect targeting is
applied compared to direct targeting.
In systems with direct targeting, such as in Turkey
and Georgia’s previous MIP, beneficiary identification is
more complex since it requires a reliable (proxy) means-
test. The effectiveness of means-testing can be assessed
by reviewing the number of exempted beneficiaries in
the bottom and top income quintile. Even though the
population coverage rates of the eligible beneficiaries im-
proved enormously over the years, targeting effectiveness
substantially varies across countries. In Turkey, the major-
ity of Green Cards was delivered to the bottom quintile
(71 % as per 2008) and 96 % of the poorest quintile were
enrolled, with no inclusion error and only a small exclu-
sion error of 6 % [23]. In contrast thereto, Georgia’s MIP
identification process faced a relatively high exclusion
error, with 54 % of the poorest and 62 % of the second
poorest decile being excluded, and some inclusion error,
with 5 % of the richest and 8 % of the second richest decile
being enrolled in the year 2011.
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However, a universalist approach may not necessarily
result in 100 % population coverage, as the case of the
Russian Federation shows. Moreover, straightforward
„going universal“requires significant budget transfers.
Countries therefore need to explore whether they have
the fiscal space to do so. A possible option for many of
these EURO countries with tight fiscal space situations
is thus to build upon their targeted approach of focusing
on the most needy groups, combined with a clear and
well planned time horizon for consecutive scale-ups for
expanded coverage.
Moreover, the enrolment procedures are also decisive.
Population coverage seems to be enhanced when the au-
thorities are active and in charge of enrolment, rather than
the individuals being responsible for their own enrolment.
This is because there are various forms of administrative
hurdles for potential beneficiaries. For example language
barriers prevented minorities in Georgia to apply for MIP
[21]. On the other hand, enrolment initiated by the au-
thorities does not automatically imply that individuals
know about their insurance status and respective rights.
Pooling arrangements and defragmentation
In all countries, and in Georgia since 2013 and Turkey
since 2012, the exempted individuals are within the same
pool as the contributors and their family dependents.
Moreover coverage membership is mandatory for both
the exempt (except for Turkey) and contributors. These
two design aspects enhance equity in access and risk
pooling as it and maximizes the redistributive capacity.
In Kyrgyzstan, in order to avoid these problems related
to multiple territorial funds, the level of pooling was
shifted from the oblast (administrative sub-national
division) to the national level in 2006. The desired
effects occurred almost immediately after this reform.
The inequalities between the oblasts reduced, also
translating in more equitable financing at the individual
level. OOP as well as utilization rates became more equal
across oblasts [20].
Integration of the exempted individuals and striving
for universality in health insurance coverage right from
the beginning, as most of the EURO countries did, is not
common for many LMIC. The typical approach that has
been taken by many countries of other regions was to
establish a SHI scheme first for formal sector employees
and then try to gradually expand coverage to those out-
side formal sector work over the years [57]. This has
proven to be difficult and meant that a large part of the
population outside formal sector employment has
remained uncovered for a long time (cf. [3, 4, 58]).
Scope of the benefit package
The comprehensiveness of the benefit package may also
influence the incentive to enrol in the SHI scheme,
especially when membership is voluntary. For example,
in Turkey, the Green Card Scheme’s benefit package ini-
tially only covered inpatient health care and the interest
to enrol was modest. Outpatient care was added in 2004
and outpatient drugs in 2005. Between 2003 and 2006
the number of registered exempted beneficiaries rose
from 4 to 11 % of the population [23], although clearly
other factors, e.g. better communication and enrolment
outreach, also explain this rise.
The scope of the benefit package also influences the
degree of financial protection and utilization rates. In
the Republic of Moldova, for example, only a limited set
of outpatient drugs is covered [26], which might explain
the low utilization rates among the poorest compared to
the richest, as well as the low level of financial protec-
tion. In Georgia, for example, the MIP with a compre-
hensive benefit, improved financial protection of its
beneficiaries. However, patients still faced OOP, though
significantly lower than non-beneficiaries because of the
exclusion of outpatient drugs in the benefit package,
while utilization rates among beneficiaries did not in-
crease. The insufficient coverage of pharmaceuticals is
one possible explanation for this finding since it might
demotivate patients from seeking care. Starting in 2010,
a small package of outpatient drugs was included [52].
Related to this is the concern about formal co-
payments for health services, as they are a barrier for
equity in utilization and result in unequitable financial
protection in many of the countries assessed. Findings
suggest that formal cost-sharing as well as under the
table payments significantly reduce utilization rates, with
a stronger effect on the poor often belonging to the
group with the greatest health needs [26, 27]. In order to
enhance equitable financing and access, most countries
apply cost-sharing exemptions for some of the non-
contributing beneficiaries, notably the most vulnerable
groups. For example, in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia
and Montenegro, health expenditure as a share of total
household expenditure is more similar across quintiles
[18], with the cost-sharing exemptions for the non-
contributors being possibly one reason.
Finally, a disproportionally higher burden falls on vul-
nerable and low-income groups due to usually regressive
informal payments. Controlling, reducing or turning
them into official co-payments remains a challenge for
many countries. Causes for informal payments are multiple,
and apart from reviewing the benefit package design and
the inclusion of medicines, purchasing and provider pay-
ment issues also need to be addressed (cf. [39]). Yet,
Kyrgyzstan is a positive example where informal payments
significantly declined since 2001. It is argued that in-
creased awareness of the patients about the services
covered by the benefit package and additional funding
for hospitals may have contributed to this [30].
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Conclusion
This paper explored patterns in the institutional design
of state budget transfer arrangements to exempt specific,
often in particular vulnerable population groups from
contributions. It also assessed their plausible impact on
deepening UHC, with the aim to identify those key institu-
tional design features being conducive for UHC progress.
Notably, nearly all countries avoided fragmentation
and different degrees of benefit package coverage by es-
tablishing right from its start a scheme that pooled both
contributions and state budget transfers on behalf of the
exempted groups, along with mandatory membership
for all. Full contribution exemption via general govern-
ment revenues allowed to cover a large range of popula-
tion groups outside formal sector work. Exemption from
cost-sharing for non-contributing groups is critical.
These design features ultimately serve to ensure equity
in access and financial protection.
Nonetheless, there remain concerns as to inequity in
access and financial protection across income quintiles
and population groups. First, there are still a few popula-
tion groups that are not eligible for exemption, namely
the Roma in some countries, needy people without so-
cial assistance and self-employed farmers. There is an
urgent need to expand eligibility to cover those hard to
reach.
Another reform issue is the insufficient coverage of
pharmaceuticals, with concerns relating to catastrophic
expenditure, impoverishment and informal payments,
especially for low-income groups. Finally, the recent
financial crisis as well as ongoing demographic changes
point to the need to find long-term solutions for the sus-
tainability of such financing arrangements.
Overall, more evidence on the impacts of this finan-
cing arrangement should be collected, differentiated
across population groups and income quintiles. Further
analysis could explore whether policies are effectively being
implemented. Evaluations could also assess enrolment pro-
ceedings in more detail. For example, is active enrolment
by the authorities indeed more conducive to higher enrol-
ment rates than making enrolment the responsibility of the
individual?
Altogether, this analysis shows that budget transfers to
cover those outside formal sector work can be indeed a
viable path to expanding and deepening UHC.
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